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Supplemental Social Insurance
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ABSTRACT
In 1974 the federal government instituted Supplemental Social Insurance
(SSI). The eligible group was the elderly on welfare and disabled individuals.
The program distributed extra incomeandmade people eligible for Medicaid in
all states except Arizona which did not have Medicaid. We used subjective and
objective health information in the Retirement History Survey (RHS) to examine
theimpact of the program. The RHSis a sample that began in 1969 and included
headsof households who were 58 to 63 years old. The respondents or widows
were resurveyed every secondyear through 1977. Before 1974those who sub-
sequently received SSI were inmuch worse health than those who did not.









(215) 898—8471Supplemental Social Insurance, which began in 1974, is a program intended
to increase the transfer payments, income, and medical care of those elderly
who are on welfare rolls or anyone who is blind or disabled.' The amount
given depends on family composition and accumulated financial resources but in
1974 varied from $140 a month for a single individual to $210 for a couple.
"Essential persons" —ineligiblespouses or relatives living with the eligible
person —werealso provided for with a maximum of $70 a month.
Eligible persons may also receive state supplementary SSI payments.
These payments are mandatory to those whose state welfare payments exceeded
the SSI payments in 1973. States could also provide payments at their own
discretion. In 1974 combined SSI payments made to individuals ranged from
$140 a month (in 25 states) to $250 in Alaska. The state supplementary
payments are either state or federally administered at the discretion of the
state. In addition the law mandated that people who receive SSI also are
eligible for Medicaid.2
An important element in the welfare of the poor is their health.
Morbidity and mortality of the elderly increase rapidly for people above the
age of 60. For example, according to the 1977 Vital Statistics the death rate
per year is 1.4, 3.1, and 7.27. at ages 55 to 64, 65 to 74, and 75 to 84
respectively. Similarly in the Retirement History Survey (RHS) which is the
data set used in our analysis, the proportion of people with health better
than others of the same age declines rapidly over time while the proportion
1 Foreligibility criteria see the Social Security Handbook, which is also the
source of the following details.
2Arizona did not have Medicaid and some fifteen State8 have stricter
financial levels than the SSI income level and would require some extra
expenditures by SSI recipients. See Davidson and Marmor (1980) for details.
1with worse health than others increases rapidly. In addition, Rosen and
Taubman (1982) have shown that in the RHS those in the worse health category
at one point in time have only a small probability of returning to the better
category though this probability increases with education.
Governmental programs in general and the SSI program in particular are
often described as well meaning but unsuccessful. The failure may occur for
several reasons. First the targeted population is ill defined and the
criteria used to establish eligibility leave out too many who should be
eligible and/or let in too many who should be ineligible. Second, the people
receiving the aid either squander it or engage in reallocations so that the
intended beneficiary is not made better of f.3 Third, to run the program is so
costly that the loss in social efficiency more than offsets the gain in social
equity. However, only 207. to 307. of the population in the post 65 age group
works; hence, it seems unlikely that this particular benefit affects
retirement—labor force participation choices and thus much of these
inefficiency effects will be muted.4Furthermore it is doubtful that people
in this income range were at or near the satiation point; hence, more income
must lead to more utility, although there still remains the question of
whether the elderly poor were helped substantially.
SSI will be successful if it aids people to recover good health, prevents
a drop in the percentage in better health, or reduces age specific mortality
rates. This paper examines the impact of the Supplemental Social Insurance
program on individual health status to see if the program hashad its
designated effect. To determine if the program has had these impacts we make
See Becker (1981) on Head Start.
In 1973 33.5% of the men aged 66—67 were in the labor force. In 1975, the
corresponding percentage was 21.7%.
2use of a longitudinal sample in which some of the surveys took place before
the program began and some after. The sample used also contains people who
were eligible and others who were not for SSI.
Section 1 discusses the RHS from which the data for this study was
drawn. Section 2 presents a descriptive analysis of temporal health patterns
for five biennual periods from 1969 through 1977. In section 3 we carry out
an ordered probit analysis of morbidity for each of the five time periods and
also present estimates of the relative risks of worse health and death if SSI
were cut back. Section 4 concludes.
1. The Data
The data used in this study come from the Retirement History Survey which
contains five biennial surveys taken during the period 1969 through 1977 and
individually matched records of Social Security earnings beginning in 1950.
The sample contains about 8500 men and 2500 women all of whom were heads of
household in 1969. Thus by standard though archaic usage, married women
spouse present will not be sampled except in very unusual circumstances. In
the sample about 3% of the men and 10% of the women received SSI in 1975.
The sample is designed to study why people retire when they do and what
happens after retirement. The sample contains objective health information
such as date of death and hospitalization and subjective information such as
how your health compares with others of the same age and how it has changed
over time.
For our study we use both the mortality and the subjective morbidity
information. We believe that the subjective information is a good proxy for
objective measures despite the arguments presented by Parsons (1982) who in a
younger age group finds that labor force participation responds "correctly" to
3a fixed transfer benefit/potential wage rate variable when a mortality index
is used but "incorrectly" when a subjective measure similar to ours is used as
a health measure. Our belief is based on the following. In the RHS, the
people who report themselves in worse health are twice as likely to die in a 4
year time span as those in better health (Rosen and Taubman (1982)), have
Parsons' "correct" sign on the benefit/wage variable (Slade (1981)) and
generally display the properties one would expect in a health production
function (Rosen and Taubman (1982), and Carleton (l98l)).
2. Temporal Health Patterns
Prior research has indicated that health varies with some socioeconomic
characteristics such as education.6 It may be argued that these char-
acteristics cause both the poor health and the individual's eligibility for
SSI. Thus there are some advantages in simply comparing the SSI population
with the non SSI population in each year without controlling for education and
other factors.
To determine eligibility when the people were 65 to 70 years old we use
the income information in 1975 for 1975 and earlier and the 1977 information
in that year. A detailed breakdown contains SSI as a separate category. We
For example married men in worse health are much more likely to survive 4
years than non—married men.
6Previous studies in the general area include Kitagawa and Hauser (1973),
Lerner (1980), Link, Long, and Settle (1982), Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
Statistical Bulletin (1977), and Yeracaris and Kim (1978).
4then use 1975 eligibility in earlier time periods.7
In tables 1—5 we present the distribution of health states in the various
years for 4 groups: those receiving SSI in 1975 or 1977, those in 1975
receiving the minimum retirement benefit who retired early, those in 1975
receiving the tniniumum benefit who retired at 65, and the remainder. As the
large chi—squared statistics indicate these distributions are not very
similar.
We distinguish the minimum benefit group because they are receiving a
benefit proportionally greater than entitled by their prior contributions.
People receiving minimum benefits are thought to include two distinct groups,
those with "permanent" low earnings capacity which occurs partially because of
poor health and those who worked primarily in nonsocial security covered
occupations (such as the Federal Government) who are on average not in poor
health and who receive another pension.
In 1969 about 15% of the SSI eligible population were in better health
than others. The corresponding figures for miniumum, early retirement, and
the remaining sample members are 27%, 33% and 35% respectively. The
percentage in worse health for the same groups (in the same order) are 45, 25,
21 and 19.8 A glance at these percentages indicate that in 1969 morbidity
varies substantially with social security status. The nonminimum benefit
7mere is a potentially important problem with using the 1975 eligibility for
prior periods. If the person dies before 1975, we will not learn with
certainty If he would have been eligible. We can, however, estimate this
probability and correct for the selectivity bias. The results with and
without the mills ratio were quite similar and we chose to report the
latter. Results correcting for the selectivity bias are available from the
authors.
8A chi—square test of the null hypothesis that the frequency distributions
are the same across social security status yields a test statistic of 211.4.
The chi square statistic with three degrees of freedom is 5.99 at a
significance level of .05.
5people are healthier than the other groups, the SSI eligible group is the
least healthy, and the early retirement group is less healthy than the regular
group. Moreover, the SSI eligible group is much less healthythan the others.
Moving to 1971 and 1973, we observe an overall worsening of health but
very similar patterns. The SSI and rniniumum benefit earlyretirement groups
remained about constant while the others' health worsened somewhat, but the
SSI eligibles are in far worse health.9
SSI beginsin1974. In 1975, when the people were 65 to 70 years old,
the distributions are much different. The percentage in better health are 17,
27, 39 and 25 for those in the SSI, early minimum benf it, regular minimum
benefit and other category. All categories show an increase from their 1973
levels of 2—37. except the miniumumretirementgroup which increases almost 97..
Inthe worse health than others category, the percentages are 30, 21, 19
and 11 respectively. This represents a drop of about 5% for the SSI group and
3% in the other category. The minimum benefit early retirement remained
virtually the same while the early retirement group increased abut 4%. Those
dead increased by about two points in each category. Measured in rates of
growth the SSI recipients did much better.
In 1977 the improvement for the SSI groups continues. The SSI group has
a slight increase while the others record a drop in the better category.
In general the results from the pre and post SSI program suggest that the
program has improved the health of the SSI recipients. We turn next to some
inultivariate estimates that will allow us to control for other determinants of
morbidity and mortality.
The regular minimum retirement group has the highest fraction in better
health, but there are only 80 people in this cell.
63. Ordered Probits
Better, same, worse health and dead are distinct health categories
(states) that can be rank ordered. We can make use of the rankings to
establish an estimate of the cardinal differences between the states. The
technique was introduced by Aitchison and Bennett (1970), and has been
generalized to handle heteroscedasticity by Akin, Guilkey, and Sickles (1979)
and endogenous explanatory variables by Lee (1982). The standard model used
in this study assumes that the coefficients are stable across states and that
the error distribution is independent of characteristics of the state. We use
two conventional normalizations to set the error variance to unity and the








Sifi5 < y<i81 ,p_1- =-I
and where X and are (lxk) and (kxl) vectors of explanatory exogenous
variables and coefficients; c1 is identically and independently distributed
as N(0,1) and the i's are nonstochastic thresholds. The likelihood function
for each sample at time t is given by
(3.3) L= ffj(x—i)—(XB—)i i= Iy
I y—l
7where (X) is the distribution function for the standardized normal. The
estimation of (3.3) was carried out using the Gauss—Newton method. The
gradient and information matrix are given in McKelvey and Zavonia (1978).
Table 6.1 presents estimates for the various years. The independent
variables used include education, age and, for 1975 and 1977, the dollar
amount of SSI in 1975 or, if none, then in 1977. We also control for whether
or not the individual is married and living with their spouse, is single or
widowed, their race, sex, and if female whether or not her occupation is
housewife. The final dummy variable indicates whether or not the individual
receives SSI. Table 6.11 contains a similar set of results but with prior
health states and dummy variables for minimum and minimum early retirement
benefits as additional explanatory variables. We also present the estimated
thresholds and —2ln(A) where A is the likelihood ratio under the null
hypothesis that all coefficients other than the thresholds are zero.
In 1969, 1971, and 1973 the coefficient on SSI is statistically
significant and indicates that those eligible are in worse health. These
coefficients vary little over this time interval as do the marginal
probabilities evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables. In
1975 and 1977 the coefficients become statistically insignificant with a very
low statistic especially in 1977.
We can examine health change equations by adding prior health status to
the analysis. Rosen and Taubman (1982) report that the inclusion of this
variable generally reduces the significance level of other independent
variables. This effect is found in 1971 and 1973 though the 1973 coefficient
is almost significant at the 5% level.
An interesting result in the tables is that those receiving minimum
8benefits usually are in significantly better health. This remains true even
after controlling for prior health. This may be due to the often argued point
that a major population component of the minimum retirement benefit group are
people who primarily work for the U.S. government but take a job covered by
Social Security for the minimum time needed to collect benefits.
Our results suggest that people have benefited from SSI and thus would be
at a higher risk of poor health or death if their SSI income were reduced.
Table 7 reports these relative odds for the states worse health and death
using the estimates from Table 6.1. The odds ratios are generated from the
polytomous probit estimates by first calculating the probability that an
individual would be in the particular state, identified by two adjacent
thresholds, given a set of demographic characteristics for a given level of
SSI. We then perform the same calculations at a different level of SSI. The
ratio is the odds ratio. We present results for different configurations of
dummy variables at average age and education. For illustrative purposes we
chose an annual reduction in payments from $3000 annually to zero and from
$2000 to zero. As one can see the level of SSI income has a dramatic effect
on the relative odds of being in worse health and of death. For example, in
1977 a white male living with his spouse would be at a 71% greater risk of
death if his SSI benefits were cut $3000.00/year. Interestingly the effect of
reduced SSI income on risk of death is significantly higher than is the effect
on the risk of worse health.
The effect of SSI on the pattern of morbidity over time is illustrated in
Figure 1. We can see that over the sample period the health status of the
average individual has deteriorated. However we can also see the dramatic
relative improvement in health status brought about by the SSI program which
starts in 1975. Clearly those who were included in this program benefited,
9either in terms of objective health measures or in terms of self—perceived
health status.
4.Conclusion
Our results indicate that people receiving SSI payments have improved
their health once the program began. These results do not tell us why,
although an obvious possibility is that the funds are used for preventive and
curative health expenditures. The RHS does have data on such expenditures but
we have not yet studied them in this regard. However, Link, Long and Settle
(1982) have recently published some relevant results based on the 1969, '74
and '76 Health Interview Surveys. They indicate on page 206 that those with
income less than 5,O0O utilized hospitals and (if chronically ill) physicians
far less than those with higher income in 1969 but that these differences had
been substantially reduced or eliminated by 1976. Of course, medicare and
medicaid provisions also changed over this time period but the trend was to
increase co—pay provisions and to reduce government help and thus increase the
private costs of health care. Thus it appears that SSI has helped maintain
and improve the health stock of the elderly.
10Table 1
Health in 1969
RECEIVES EARL( MIN ALL




Number 73 97 26 3577 3773
Col PCT 15.40 26.80 32.50 34.98
2. Health Same
as Others
Number 188 174 37 4689 5088
Col PCT 39.66 48.07 46.25 45.85
3. Health Worse
than Others
Number 213 91 17 1961 2282
Col PCT 44.94 25.14 21.25 19.17
TOTAL 474 362 80 10227 11143




RECEIVES EARLY MIN ALL
SSI MIN RET RET OTHERS TOTAL
1. Health Better
than Others
of the same age
Number 111 97 23 2743 2974
ColPCT 15.95 26.80 28.75 27.42
2. Health Same
as Others
Number 328 180 43 5242 5793
Col PCT 47.13 49.72 53.75 52.39
3. Health Worse
than Others
Number 237 81 14 1557 1889
Col PCT 34.05 22.38 17.5 15.56
4. Dead
Number 20 4 0 463 487
Col PCT 2.87 1.10 0.00 4.63
TOTAL 696 362 80 10005 11143




RECEIVES EARLY MIN ALL




Number 67 87 24 2401 2579
Col PCT 14.14 24.03 30.00 23.48
2. Health Same
as Others
Number 214 193 44 5438 5889
Col PCT 45.15 53.31 55.00 53.17
3. Health Worse
than Others
Number 166 77 12 1442 1697
Col PCT 35.02 21.27 15.00 14.10
4. Dead
Number 27 5 0 946 978
Col PCT 5.70 1.38 0.00 9.25
TOTAL 474 362 80 10227 11143




RECEIVES EARLY MIN ALL




Number 117 98 31 2546 2792
Col PCT 16.81 27.07 38.75 25.45
2. Health Same
asOthers
Number 323 177 32 5132 5664
Col PCT 46.41 48.90 40.00 51.29
3. Health Worse
than Others
Number 207 76 15 1128 1426
Col PCT 29.74 20.99 18.75 11.27
4. Dead
Number 49 11 2 1199 1261
Col PCT 7.04 3.04 2.50 11.98
TOTAL 696 362 80 10005 11143




RECEIVES EARLY MIN ALL




Number 125 94 22 2247 2488
Col PCT 17.96 25.97 27.50 22.46
2. Health Same
as Others
Number 315 185 40 5375 5915
Col PCT 45.26 51.10 50.00 53.72
3. Health Worse
than Others
Number 191 65 13 948 1217
Col PCT 27.44 17.96 16.25 9.48
4. Dead
Number 65 18 5 1435 1523
Col PCT 9.34 4.97 6.25 14.34
TOTAL 696 362 80 10005 11143




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Selected Relative Risks (in percents) of Worse Health
or Death Given a Cut Back in SSI
DummyVariable Reduction of $2000 Annually
Configuration
Year MSP SING WID BK FEM I{W Worse Health Death
1 0 00 00 15 35
Reduction of $3000 Annually
Worse HealthDeath
25 58
0 0 10 1 1
0 1 00 00
1 0 01 00
1975
14 34 24 56
12 32 21 54
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